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Evaluation	   literature	   has	   paid	   relatively	   little	   attention	   to	   the	   specific	   needs	   of	  
evaluating	   large,	   complex	   industrial	   and	   infrastructure	   projects,	   often	   called	  
‘megaprojects’.	   	   The	   abundant	   megaproject	   governance	   literature,	   in	   turn,	   has	  
largely	   focused	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   “megaproject	   pathologies”,	   i.e.	   the	   chronic	   budget	  
overruns,	  and	  failure	  of	  such	  projects	  to	  keep	  to	  timetables	  and	  deliver	  the	  expected	  
social	  and	  economic	  benefits.	  This	  article	  draws	  on	   these	   two	   strands	  of	   literature,	  
identifies	   shortcomings,	   and	   suggests	   potential	   pathways	   towards	   an	   improved	  
evaluation	   of	   megaprojects.	   To	   counterbalance	   the	   current	   overemphasis	   on	  
relatively	   narrowly	   defined	   accountability	   as	   the	   main	   function	   of	   megaproject	  
evaluation,	  and	   the	  narrow	  definition	  of	  project	   success	   in	  megaproject	  evaluation,	  
the	   article	   argues	   that	   conceptualising	   megaprojects	   as	   dynamic	   and	   evolving	  
networks	  would	  provide	  a	  useful	  basis	  for	  the	  design	  evaluation	  approach	  better	  able	  
to	   promote	   learning	   and	   to	   address	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   aspects	   of	  megaprojects.	   A	  
modified	   version	   of	   “network	   mapping”	   is	   suggested	   as	   a	   possible	   framework	   for	  
megaproject	   evaluation,	   with	   the	   exploration	   of	   the	   multiple	   accountability	  
relationships	   as	   a	   central	   evaluation	   task,	   designed	   to	   reconcile	   learning	   and	  
accountability	  as	   the	  central	  evaluation	   functions.	  The	  article	  highlights	   the	  role	  of	  
evaluation	   as	   an	   ‘emergent’	   property	   of	   spontaneous	  megaproject	   ‘governing’,	   and	  
explores	  the	  challenges	  that	  this	  poses	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  evaluator	  in	  governance.	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La	   littérature	   en	   évaluation	   a	   payée	   relativement	   peu	   d’attention	   aux	   défis	  
spécifiques	   que	   pose	   l’évaluation	   des	   grands,	   complexes	   projets	   d’infrastructure,	  
souvent	  appelés	  «	  mégaprojets	  ».	  L’ample	  littérature	  concernant	  la	  gouvernance	  des	  
mégaprojets,	  pour	  sa	  part,	  s’est	  concentré	  principalement	  sur	  les	  «	  pathologies	  »	  des	  
mégaprojets,	  à	  savoir	  la	  tendance	  chronique	  de	  ces	  projets	  de	  dépasser	  leurs	  budgets	  
et	  les	  échéances	  de	  réalisation,	  ainsi	  que	  de	  générer	  les	  bénéfices	  	  socioéconomiques	  
escomptés.	  Cet	  article	  s’appuiera	  sur	  ces	  deux	  littératures,	  y	  identifie	  des	  faiblesses,	  et	  
suggère	  des	  pistes	  vers	  une	  évaluation	  améliorée	  des	  mégaprojets.	  Afin	  de	  redresser	  
le	  présent	  déséquilibre	  en	  faveur	  de	  la	  reddition	  des	  comptes	  –	  définie	  d’une	  manière	  
relativement	  étroite	  –	  	  	  comme	  la	  principale	  fonction	  de	  l’évaluation	  des	  mégaprojets,	  
et	  en	  vue	  d’élargir	  les	  critères	  de	  succès	  dans	  l’évaluation	  des	  mégaprojets,	  cet	  article	  
suggère	  qu’une	  conceptualisation	  des	  mégaprojets	  comme	  des	  réseaux	  dynamiques	  et	  
évolutifs	  fournit	  une	  base	  fructueuse	  pour	  la	  conception	  d’une	  approche	  d’évaluation	  
mieux	   à	   même	   de	   promouvoir	   l’apprentissage	   et	   d’adresser	   les	   aspects	  
socioéconomiques	   des	   mégaprojets.	   Une	   version	   adaptée	   de	   la	   «	  cartographie	   de	  
réseaux	  »	  est	  proposée	  comme	  un	  possible	  cadre	  pour	   l’évaluation	  des	  mégaprojets,	  
avec	   l’exploration	   des	   multiples	   rapports	   de	   responsabilité	   comme	   une	   tâche	  
d’évaluation	   centrale,	   conçue	   pour	   réconcilier	   l’apprentissage	   et	   la	   reddition	   des	  
comptes	   comme	   les	   fonctions	   d’évaluation	   centrales.	   L’article	   souligne	   le	   rôle	   de	  
l’évaluation	   comme	   une	   propriété	   «	  émergente	  »	   de	   processus	   spontanés	   de	  
gouvernement	   des	   projets,	   et	   explore	   les	   défis	   liés	   au	   rôle	   de	   l’évaluateur	   dans	   la	  
gouvernance	  des	  mégaprojets.	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Megaproject	  pathologies	  and	  “the	  socio-­‐economic”	  	  	  Increasing	   attention	   has	   recently	   been	   paid	   to	   what	   have	   become	   called	  “megaprojects”	  (e.g.	  Flyvbjerg	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Flyvbjerg,	  2007;	  2011),	  i.e.	  “large-­‐scale,	  complex	   infrastructure	   projects	   usually	   commissioned	   by	   governments	   and	  delivered	   through	   partnerships	   between	   public	   and	   private	   organisations,	   with	  multiple	   partners,	   high	   uncertainties,	   and	   considerable	   political	   stakes	   (van	  Marrewijk	   et	   al.,	   2008:	   591). These	   typically	   include	   infrastructure	   construction	  projects,	  such	  as	  motorways,	  tunnels,	  bridges,	  railways	  or	  ports,	  which	  frequently	  “respond	  to	  global	  competition	  among	  cities	  for	  investments,	  knowledge	  workers,	  tourists	   and	   prestige”	   (Bornstein,	   2007),	   and	   are	   expected	   to	   deliver	   multiple	  benefits	   to	   the	   society.	  What	  make	  megaprojects	   distinct	   are	   their	   exceptionally	  large	  budgets,	   and	  hence	   considerable	   economic	   and	  political	   interests	   involved;	  considerable	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   scales;	   continuous	   evolution	   and	   dynamism,	  including	   project	   governance	   and	   the	   institutional	   framework;	   and	   strong	  normative	   disagreements	   among	   parties	   involved,	   at	   different	   levels	   of	  governance.	  Furthermore,	  their	  one-­‐of-­‐a-­‐kind	  nature	  (lack	  of	  precedents),	  as	  well	  as	   the	   complex	   causal	   relationships	   and	   high	   degree	   of	   scientific,	   political	   and	  institutional	  uncertainties	  render	  megaprojects	  particularly	  challenging	  objects	  of	  evaluation	  (e.g.	  Altshuler	  and	  Luberoff,	  2003;	  Flyvbjerg,	  2007;	  2011;	  Flyvbjerg	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Flyvbjerg	  and	  Priemus,	  2007;	  OMEGA	  2012).	  	  	  Evaluation	  literature	  has	  thus	  far	  paid	  surprisingly	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  evaluation	  of	   such	   large	   infrastructure	  projects	   (cf.	  Verweij	   and	  Gerrits,	  2013),	  whereas	   the	  literature	   on	   the	   governance	   and	   evaluation	   of	   megaprojects	   has	   concentrated	  mainly	  on	  so-­‐called	  megaproject	  “pathologies”,	  notably	  cost	  overruns,	  time	  delays,	  public	   resistance,	   and	   failure	   to	   deliver	   the	   promised	   benefits	   (Priemus,	   2010).	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   this	   “iron	   triangle”	   of	  megaproject	   performance	   criteria	  (OMEGA,	  2012:	  2),	  uncertainties	  appear	  as	  exclusively	  problematic,	  insofar	  as	  they	  accentuate	  the	  risk	  of	  chronic	  overestimation	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  underestimation	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  construction	  time	  of	  the	  project	  (e.g.	  Flyvbjerg,	  2007:	  12-­‐13).	  This	  paper	  argues	  that	  such	  an	  emphasis	  on	  megaproject	  “pathologies”	   is	  based	  on	  an	  insufficient	  and	  one-­‐sided	  conceptualisation	  of	  megaprojects,	  and	  has	  contributed	  to	  an	  excessive	   focus	  of	  accountability	  as	   the	   sole	  objective	  of	  evaluation	  of	   such	  projects,	  while	  overlooking	  in	  particular	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  uncertainty	  as	  a	  source	  of	   learning,	  reflexivity	  and	  adaptive	  governance.	  With	  few	  exceptions	  (e.g.	  OMEGA,	  2012),	   literature	  on	  megaproject	  governance	  and	  appraisal	  has	   failed	   to	  take	   on	   board	   many	   of	   the	   lessons	   from	   policy	   and	   programme	   evaluation	   and	  network	   governance,	   or	   integrate	   the	   broader	   objectives	   of	   sustainable	  development	  into	  its	  evaluation	  arsenal.	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The	   article	   argues	   that	   a	   central	   challenge	  of	  megaproject	   evaluation	   is	   to	   foster	  the	  adoption	  of	  more	  reflexive	  and	  learning-­‐oriented	  evaluation	  approaches,	  while	  fully	  taking	  into	  account	  especially	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  impacts	  of	  such	  large-­‐scale	  projects.	   Greater	   attention	   to	   learning	   and	   improvement	   should	   not	   mean	  abandoning	  accountability	  as	  a	  major	  objective	  of	  evaluation	  –	  rather,	  this	  article	  calls	   for	  a	  better	  balance	  between	  the	  accountability	  and	   learning	  objectives,	  and	  for	  a	  redefinition	  of	  accountability	  so	  as	  to	  better	  accommodate	  the	  two	  evaluation	  functions.	   The	   article	   starts	   from	   the	   observation	   that	   despite	   their	   numerous	  common	  characteristics,	  megaprojects	  represent	  a	  partly	  heterogeneous	  group	  of	  entities	   that	   can	   usually	   better	   be	   described	   as	   networks	   or	   programmes	   of	  projects	   (OMEGA,	   2012)	   than	   as	   discrete	   projects	   with	   clearly	   circumscribed	  boundaries.	  	  	  The	   article	   is	   based	   on	   a	   survey	   of	   literature	   conducted	   as	   part	   of	   a	   project	  exploring	   the	  prospects	  of	   the	  evaluation	  of	   socio-­‐economic	  aspects	  of	  geological	  disposal	  of	  high-­‐level	   radioactive	  waste	   in	   a	  deep	  underground	   repository.1	  Such	  projects	   illustrate	  the	  diversity	  of	  megaproject	   in	  that	  they	  exhibit	  many	  features	  typical	  of	  megaprojects	  –	  even	  pushing	  these	  to	  an	  extreme	  –	  while	  in	  some	  ways	  departing	   from	   “conventional”	  megaprojects.	   Starting	   from	   a	   broad	   definition	   of	  evaluation,	  covering	  ex	  ante	  assessment	  as	  well	  as	  the	  various	  types	  of	  monitoring	  and	  ex	  post	  evaluation,2	  the	  article	  emphasises	  the	  emergent	  nature	  of	  evaluations	  and	   their	   consequences	   in	   a	   context	   involving	  multiple	   actors	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  governing	  of	  megaprojects.	  A	  starting	  assumption	  underpinning	  this	  article	  is	  that	  no	   single	   evaluation	   framework	   can	   satisfy	   the	   multiple	   needs	   of	   megaproject	  evaluation.	   Hence,	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   suggestions	   towards	   ‘improved’	  megaproject	  evaluation	  presented	  in	  this	  article	  need	  to	  be	  judged	  case	  by	  case,	  in	  the	   light	   of	   the	   largely	   uncontrollable	   context	   of	   a	   broader	   ‘ecosystem’	   of	  evaluations	   likely	   to	   emerge	   as	   a	   product	   of	   spontaneous	   project	   ‘governing’	  (Sanderson,	  2012).	  	  	  The	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  two	  introduces	  the	  dominant	  literature	  on	   megaprojects	   and	   summarises	   the	   key	   argument	   concerning	   megaproject	  “pathologies”.	   Section	   three	   traces	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   current	   overemphasis	   on	  accountability	  by	   identifying	  shortcomings	   in	  the	  way	  megaproject	  governance	   is	  conceptualised	   in	   the	   literature.	   Section	   four	   outlines	   key	   elements	   of	   an	  alternative	   approach	   to	   megaproject	   evaluation,	   drawing	   in	   particular	   on	   the	  “network	  mapping”	   of	   Benjamin	   and	   Greene	   (2009),	   and	   network	   evaluation	   as	  described	  by	  Hertting	  and	  Vedung	  (2012).	  Section	  five	  concludes.	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  A	   number	   of	   characteristics	   inherent	   to	   megaprojects	   render	   their	   ex	   ante	  evaluation	   particularly	   challenging.	   These	   include	   notably	   the	   perceived	  uniqueness	   of	   the	   designs	   and	   technologies	   applied,	   i.e.	   the	   lack	   of	   previous	  experience	   of	   sufficiently	   similar	   projects;	   the	   considerable	   temporal	   and	   spatial	  scales	   involved;	   the	   dynamism	   and	   evolution	   of	   the	   project	   scope,	   ambition	   and	  governance;	   complex,	   multilevel	   and	   multi-­‐actor	   governance	   structures;	   high	  uncertainties	  that	  result	  notably	  from	  the	  long	  time-­‐scales,	  the	  strong	  potential	  of	  irreversible	  impacts,	  and	  the	  evolving	  nature	  of	  the	  projects;	  and	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	   project	   benefits	   to	   accrue	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   while	   most	   of	   the	   negative	  impacts	   are	   felt	   locally	   (Flyvbjerg	   et	   al.	   2003;	   Gagnon,	   2003:	   86-­‐87;	   Flyvbjerg,	  2007;	  2011;	  Priemus,	  2010).3	  	  Empirical	   experience	   from	   across	   the	   world	   demonstrates	   that	   such	   projects	  frequently	  suffer	  from	  “pathologies”	  (Primus,	  2010),	  i.e.	  they	  fail	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  “iron	   triangle”	   criteria	   of	   project	   management	   (OMEGA,	   2012)	   of	   delivering	  projects	   “on	   time,	   on	   budget	   and	   to	   prescribed	   specifications”	   (Flyvbjerg	   et	   al.,	  2003).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  project	  selection	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  “survival	  of	  the	  unfittest”,	  i.e.	  the	  selection	  and	  financing	  of	  the	  least	  viable	  among	  the	   projects	   (Flyvbjerg,	   2009;	   2011).	   Flyvbjerg	   et	   al.	   (2003;	   see	   also	   Flyvbjerg,	  2009)	  evoke	  two	  key	  reasons	  for	  such	  a	  failure	  in	  project	  selection:	  first,	  “optimism	  bias”,	  or	  “planning	  fallacy”,	  i.e.	  the	  natural	  inclination	  of	  people	  to	  estimate	  things	  more	   positively	   than	   one	   could	   objectively	   derive	   from	   practice,	   and	   second,	  “strategic	  misrepresentation”,	  or	  “malevolent	  design”	  (van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.,	  2008:	  599),	   whereby	   project	   approval	   decisions	   would	   be	   mainly	   determined	   by	  strategic	  behaviour	  by	  planners	  and	  project	  advocates	  who	  would	  have	  an	  interest	  to	   lie	   and	   represent	   costs	   and	   benefits	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   would	   maximise	   the	  chances	  of	  the	  project	  winning	  public	  funding	  (Wachs,	  1989;	  Bruzelius	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  145;	   Flyvbjerg,	   2009;	   2011:	   329;	   Flyvbjerg	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   2009;	   Cantarelli	   et	   al.,	  2010).	  When	  strong	  political	  pressure	  is	  absent,	  the	  optimism	  bias	  would	  prevail,	  whereas	   “strategic	   misrepresentation”	   would	   explain	   the	   failure	   in	   politically	  charged	   situations	   –	   arguably	   the	   case	   in	   most	   megaprojects.	   Short	   political	  mandates	   further	  encourage	  misrepresentation,	  as	  does	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  costs	  of	  overruns	  and	  failed	  benefits	  would	  fall	  upon	  taxpayers	  and	  society	  at	  large	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  private	  sector	  project	  developers.	  	  Bruzelius	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  and	  Priemus	  (2010:	  1025)	  further	  argue	  that	  the	  root	  cause	  for	   incentive	   structures	   that	   encourage	   lying	   and	   opportunism	   lies	   in	   the	  
conventional	  approach	  to	  megaproject	  planning,	  whereby	  	  -­‐ the	  lack	  of	  feasibility	  studies	  and	  an	  excessively	  technical	  approach	  to	  planning	  and	  management	   lead	  to	  premature	  commitment	  to	  the	  project	  and	  a	  specific	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technical	  solution;	  	  -­‐ the	  analysis	  of	  external	  effects	  and	  inclusion	  of	  affected	  groups	  occur	  too	  late	  in	  the	  process;	  	  -­‐ no	  risk	  analysis	  is	  conducted;	  and	  	  -­‐ the	   various	   institutional,	   organisational,	   regulatory	   and	   accountability	   issues	  are	  overlooked.	  	  To	  treat	   the	  pathologies,	  Flyvbjerg	  et	  al.	   (2003;	  see	  also	  Flyvbjerg,	  2011)	  suggest	  minimising	   opportunism	   through	   explicit	   articulation	   of	   performance	  specifications,	   explicit	   formulation	   of	   the	   regulatory	   regime,	   and	   involvement	   of	  commercial	   risk	   capital.	   For	   evaluation,	   the	   fourth	   remedy	   is	   the	  most	   relevant:	  designing	   comprehensive	   ex	   ante	   governance	   arrangements	   –	   institutional	   and	  legal	  mechanisms	  designed	  to	  enhance	  transparency	  as	  well	  as	  public	  and	  private	  sector	   accountability	   through	   external	   scrutiny	   (e.g.	   benchmarking,	   peer	   review,	  media	   exposure,	   financial	   rewards,	   and	   sanctions).	   In	   essence,	   the	   call	   is	   for	  greater	   accountability	   as	   the	   main	   purpose	   and	   function	   of	   evaluation,	   as	   for	  instance	   deliberative	   approaches	   would	   be	   ineffective	   in	   the	   context	   of	  exceptionally	  high	  economic	  and	  political	  stakes	  (Flyvbjerg	  et	  al.,	  2003:	  7).	  	  
	  
Shortcomings	   in	   the	   conceptualisation	   and	   evaluation	   of	  
megaprojects	  	  The	   “iron	   triangle”	   approach	   to	   megaproject	   management	   has	   its	   critics	   in	  megaproject	   literature	   (e.g.	  van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Osland	  and	  Strand,	  2010;	  Giezen,	  2012;	  Sanderson,	  2013;	  OMEGA,	  2012),	  yet	  the	  impact	  of	  such	  alternative	  approaches	  in	  wider	  debate	  and	  governance	  of	  megaprojects	  has	  remained	  limited.	  The	   following	  section	  summarises	  the	  criticisms	  most	  relevant	   for	   the	  evaluation	  of	  megaprojects.	  	  	  
Diversity	  of	  megaprojects,	  constantly	  evolving	  project	  goals	  	  Despite	   their	   several	   common	   characteristics,	   megaprojects	   do	   not	   represent	   a	  homogeneous	   group	   of	   entities,	   and,	   consequently,	   “not	   all	   mega	   projects	   are	  planning	  disasters”	  (Giezen,	  2012:	  781),	  not	  even	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  “iron	  triangle”	  criteria.4	  As	  a	  project	  evolves,	  the	  redefinition	  of	  its	  objectives	  may	  fundamentally	  modify	   the	   nature,	   scope,	   and	   rationale	   of	   the	   project,	   and	   a	   ‘failed’	   project	  may	  hence	  be	  reclassified	  as	  a	  success	  (OMEGA,	  2012).	  Rather	  than	  a	  drop	  in	  an	  ocean	  of	   failures,	   these	   projects	   provide	   a	   basis	   for	   more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	  conditions	  under	  which	  an	  individual	  megaproject	  can	  indeed	  succeed	  (e.g.	  Giezen	  2012)	  –	  an	  approach	  largely	  neglected	  in	  the	  current	  megaproject	  research,	  which	  has	   been	   dominated	   by	   large-­‐N	   statistical	   analysis	   unable	   to	   account	   for	   the	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influence	   of	   local	   conditions	   on	  project	   performance	   (Verweij	   and	  Gerrits,	   2013:	  42).	  Furthermore,	  Osland	  and	  Strand	  (2010:	  80)	  argue	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  “unfittest”	   projects	   would	   be	   selected	   has	   not	   been	   adequately	   tested,	   since	   no	  comparison	  has	  been	  conducted	  between	  the	  approved	  and	  rejected	  projects.	  	  	  The	  diversity	  of	  megaprojects	  means	  that	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  iron	  triangle	  criteria	  varies	  across	  cases.	  For	  example,	  large	  mega-­‐events	  such	  as	  Olympic	  Games	  must	  deliver	  the	  final	   ‘product’	  on	  time,	  and	  preferably	  within	  budget	  and	  according	  to	  specifications,	   if	   they	  want	   to	   avoid	   harsh	   public	   and	  media	   criticism.	   For	  most	  megaprojects,	   budget	   and	   delivery	   time	   are	   only	   a	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   range	   of	  relevant	   considerations.	   For	   instance,	   unlike	   most	   megaprojects,	   geological	  disposal	  of	  radioactive	  waste	  derives	  its	  raison	  d’être	  from	  the	  imperative	  to	  solve	  “the	   waste	   problem”,	   with	   safety	   as	   the	   overriding	   concern	   and	   performance	  criterion.	  Delivering	  on	  time	  and	  within	  budget	  is	  important,	  but	  secondary	  to	  the	  overriding	   safety	   criterion.	   Any	   economic	   analysis	   of	   the	   project	   would	   be	  conducted	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  intergenerational	  cost-­‐effectiveness,	  rather	  than	  in	  terms	   of	   cost-­‐benefit	   ratio.	   Furthermore,	   the	   long	   history	   of	   exceptionally	   deep-­‐seated	   normative	   conflicts	   between	   the	   defenders	   and	   opponents	   of	   deep	  geological	   disposal	   sets	   these	   megaprojects	   apart	   from	  many	   others.5	  Finally,	   in	  particular	  because	  of	  the	  prevalence	  of	  the	  safety	  criterion,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  as	  regulator	  is	  probably	  even	  more	  central	  in	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  than	  in	  other	  megaprojects.	  	  	  
Neglect	  of	  the	  context	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  rationalities	  	  Most	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   megaproject	   “pathologies”	   has	   tended	   to	   adopt	   an	  external,	   large-­‐N	  approach,	  by	  definition	  unable	   to	  account	   for	   the	  crucial	  role	  of	  case-­‐specific	   political,	   environmental,	   socioeconomic	   and	   cultural	   context	   for	   the	  governance	   and	   success	   of	   megaprojects	   (OMEGA,	   2012:	   24-­‐25;	   Verweij	   and	  Gerrits,	   2013).	   The	   “iron	   triangle”	   approach	   fails	   to	   account	   for	   variation	   in	  rationalities	  and	  institutional	  structures,	  while	  building	  on	  the	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  assumption	   of	   individuals	   as	   mischievous,	   ruthless,	   opportunistic	   and	   rational	  maximisers	  of	  their	  individual	  utility,	  able	  to	  accurately	  calculate	  probabilities	  and	  optimise	   their	   own	  position	   (van	  Marrewijk	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Sanderson,	   2012:	   439).	  Van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.	  (2008:	  599)	  offer	  an	  alternative	  account,	  seeing	  megaproject	  pathologies	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  clashes	  between	  different	  rationalities	  and	  “project	  cultures”.	   Budget	   overruns,	   inflated	   forecasts,	   and	   unachieved	   public	   benefits	  would	   not	   result	   from	   malevolent	   design,	   but	   from	   the	   “normal	   practice	   of	  
professionals	   operating	   with	   limited	   knowledge,	   but	   influenced	   dramatically	   by	   a	  
range	  of	  ambiguous	  and	  uncertain	  external	  and	  internal	  forces.”	  Other	  scholars	  have	  attributed	  megaproject	   failures	   to	   “incoherent,	   inappropriate	   or	   underdeveloped	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governance	   arrangements”,	  which	   are	   inadequate	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   unavoidable	  risks,	   uncertainties	   and	   turbulence	   deriving	   from	   inside	   or	   outside	   of	   the	  organisations	   involved	   in	   megaproject	   governance	   (e.g.	   Loch	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Sanderson,	  2012).	  	  	  
Nature	  of	  the	  evaluand:	  a	  project,	  a	  programme	  of	  projects,	  or	  a	  network?	  
	  Taken	   together,	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   megaproject	   types,	   contexts	   and	   rationalities	  underpinning	   actor	   behaviour	   point	   to	   a	   number	   of	   salient	   characteristics	   of	  megaprojects,	  and	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  megaprojects	  actually	  can	   be	   seen	   as	   projects.	   From	   an	   alternative	   perspective,	  megaprojects	   are	   best	  understood	   as	   organic	   open	   systems,	   co-­‐evolving	  with	   their	   context	   –	   hence	   the	  evolution	   of	   their	   goals	   and	   objectives.	   Megaprojects	   are	   characterised	   by	   both	  substantive	   and	   institutional	   complexity,	   i.e.	   the	   subject	   matter	   (sustainable	  development,	   regional	  development,	   radioactive	  waste	  management,	   etc.)	   exhibit	  characteristics	   of	   “wicked	   problems”.	   As	   a	   result,	   traditional	   vertical	   governance	  structures	   tend	   to	   be	   inadequate,	   as	   coordination	   is	   necessary	   between	   actors	  from	  both	  public	  and	  private	  sector,	  and	  across	  policy	  sectors	  and	  levels	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  30).	  Finally,	  while	  the	  rational	  actor	  model	  is	  clearly	  one-­‐sided,	  Sanderson	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  even	  the	  alternative	  approaches	  stressing	  the	  clash	  of	   cultures	   (van	  Marrewijk	   et	   al.	   2008)	   and	   inadequate	   governance	   (Loch	   et	   al.,	  2006)	   are	   unsatisfactory,	   since	   they	   falsely	   assume	   that	   the	   complexity	   and	  irreducible	   uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   megaprojects	   can	   indeed	   be	   controlled	  through	  careful	  ex	  ante	  planning	  of	  appropriate	  governance	  measures	  (Sanderson,	  2012).6	  Instead	  of	  strategic	  planning,	  megaproject	  governance	  should	   focus	  more	  on	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  practice	  of	  “real-­‐life’	  megaproject	  “governing”,	  the	  spontaneous	  processes	  of	  emergent	  work	  practices,	   “organising	  rather	  than	  organisation”,	  and	  project	  governing	  in	  “here-­‐and-­‐now”	  (Sanderson,	  2012:	  441).	  	  It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   megaprojects	   would	   be	   more	   usefully	   characterised	   as	  “programmes	   of	   projects”	   (OMEGA,	   2012:	   36)	   or	   “networks	   of	   people	   and	  
organizations	  that	  work	  more	  or	  less	  coherently	  and	  purposefully	  to	  address	  complex	  
public	   problems”	   (Benjamin	   and	   Greene,	   2009:	   297;	   see	   also	   e.g.	   Hertting	   and	  Vedung,	   2012).	   As	   ‘open	   systems’,	   the	   boundaries	   defining	   these	   ‘projects’	   are	  therefore	  vague,	  fluid,	  and	  subject	  to	  constant	  change	  (Benjamin	  and	  Greene	  2009;	  OMEGA,	  2012).	   For	   instance,	   as	   a	   technical	  project,	   radioactive	  waste	  disposal	   is	  indeed	  clearly	  circumscribed,	  yet	  its	  implementation	  places	  the	  project	  in	  complex	  interaction	   with	   its	   territorial	   and	   cultural	   context,	   with	   regional	   development	  programmes,	  etc.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  ‘evaluand’	  cannot	  be	  clearly	  defined,	  i.e.	  it	  is	   not	   “programmatically	   organised	   or	   institutionally	   situated”	   (Benjamin	   and	  Greene,	  2009:	  297),	  and	  novel	  evaluation	  approaches	  appear	  as	  necessary.	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  The	   conventional	   and	   alternative	   notions	   of	   megaproject	   governance	   can	   be	  illustrated	   through	   the	   dichotomy	   between	   what	   Regeer	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   have	  described	  as	  the	  ‘simple’	  Mode-­‐1	  and	  the	  ‘complex’	  Mode-­‐2	  governance	  strategies	  (Table	  1).	  The	  terms	  “Mode-­‐2	  strategy”	  and	  “network	  governance”	  are	  here	  used	  interchangeably	  to	  denote	  a	  range	  of	  governance	  theories	  that	  share	  a	  number	  of	  common	   key	   characteristics. 7 	  In	   contrast	   with	   Mode-­‐1,	   focused	   on	   seeking	  solutions	   for	   relatively	   concrete	   problems	   using	  well-­‐established	  methodologies,	  Mode-­‐2	  emphasises	  “double-­‐loop”	  learning	  (e.g.	  Argyris	  and	  Schön,	  1978;	  Reed	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  adaptation,	  iteration,	  and	  flexible	  experimentation	  (Regeer	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  518).	  Mode-­‐2	  strategies	  would	  be	  better	  suited	  for	  solving	  complex,	  unstructured	  problems	  that	  require	  cooperation	  between	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  actors	  from	  different	  institutional	   backgrounds	   (Benjamin	   and	   Greene,	   2009;	   Regeer	   et	   al.	   2009:	   516,	  518).	   The	   governance	   context	   and	   accountability	   structures	   are	   ‘heterarchical’,	  characterised	   by	   interdependence,	   lateral	   accountability,	   and	   organisational	  heterogeneity,	  with	  decision-­‐making	  entailing	  not	  only	  rational	  choice	  among	  a	  set	  of	  known	  options,	  but	   in	  particular	   redefinition	  of	   the	   range	  of	  options	  available	  (Stark,	   2000;	   2001).	   Because	   of	   constant	   technological	   change,	   shifting	   societal	  preferences	  and	  power	  relations,	  and	  volatility	  of	  the	  markets,	  no	  single	  option	  is	  self-­‐evidently	  the	  best,	  since	  commitment	  to	  a	  given	  option	  means	  foregoing	  other	  options,	   whose	   value	   cannot	   be	   readily	   estimated.	   Managing	   irreversibilities	  therefore	   becomes	   a	   central	   challenge,	   entailing	   the	   need	   to	   constantly	   balance	  between	  two	  objectives:	  keeping	  the	  options	  open	  to	  retain	  the	  capacity	  of	  adapt	  to	  evolving	  situations,	  and	  maintaining	  sufficient	  control	  over	  the	  system	  through	  the	  reduction	   of	   complexity,	   closing	   down	   decisions,	   and	   establishing	   clear	   lines	   of	  accountability.	  	  Mode	   2	   or	   network	   governance	   would	   be	   justified	   when	   problems	   exhibit	   both	  substantive	   and	   institutional	   complexity,	   when	   need	   for	   coordination	   exists,	   but	  formal	  restructuring	  would	  be	  too	  demanding	  or	  politically	  cumbersome	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  33,	  36).	  While	  no	  single	  actor	  alone	  is	  dominant,	  not	  all	  actors	  are	  equal	  in	  mode	  2	  governance	  –	  especially	  the	  state	  often	  has	  a	  crucial	  role,	  as	  a	  regulator,	  legislator,	  final	  decision-­‐maker	  and	  supplier	  of	  financing	  (Kickert,	  2003:	  389).	  Network	  governance	  may	  emerge	  spontaneously	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  need	  of	  coordination	   perceived	   by	   the	   network	   members,	   yet	   an	   external	   network	  ‘facilitator’	  such	  as	  the	  government	  or	  an	  intergovernmental	  actor	  is	  often	  vital	  as	  an	  initiator	  of	  network	  governance	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012).	  	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  complexity	  appears	  not	  only	  as	  a	  problem,	  but	  above	  all	  as	  an	  opportunity	  and	  an	  institutional	  solution.	  The	  mutual	  interdependencies	  would	  encourage	   voluntary,	   horizontal	   governance	   and	   coordination	   (Hertting	   and	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Vedung	   2012,	   31),	   and	   the	   uncertainties	   and	   conflicts	   involved	   in	   megaproject	  governance	  could	  enable	  harnessing	  the	   inevitable	  uncertainties	   to	   the	  benefit	  of	  reflexivity,	  adaptability	  and	  exploration	  of	  alternative	  pathways	  (e.g.	  Gelatt,	  1989).	  	  Radioactive	  waste	  management	  represents	  an	   interesting	  example	   in	  view	  of	   the	  “participatory	   turn”	   (Sundqvist	   and	   Elam,	   2010),	   i.e.	   a	   move	   towards	   a	   more	  dialogical,	   participatory	   and	   at	   least	   allegedly	   more	   reflexive	   governance	  approaches	   that	   governance	   in	   this	   area	   has	   taken	   since	   the	   early	   1990s.	  While	  these	  megaprojects	   therefore	   no	   longer	   fully	   correspond	   to	   the	   above-­‐described	  “conventional	  approach	  to	  megaproject	  planning”	  (Bruzelius	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Priemus,	  2010:	   1025),	   the	   tensions	  between	  mode	  1	   and	  mode	  2	   governance	  persist:	   one	  single	  generic	   solution	  –	  deep	  geological	  disposal	  –	  has	  been	  widely	  accepted	  by	  governments	   and	   key	   international	   organisations	   as	   the	   ‘best’	   solution	   for	   the	  problem,	  whereas	  public	  opposition,	  potential	  changes	  in	  nuclear	  energy	  policies,	  and	   persisting	   local	   opposition	   represent	   ‘external	   risks’	   that	   push	   for	   “opening	  up”	  of	  the	  governance	  situation	  (Stirling,	  2008).	  Exploration	  of	  such	  tensions	  and	  discrepancies	  would	  constitute	  a	  central	  task	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  megaprojects.	  	  [Insert	  table	  1]	  	  
Accountability	  as	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  in	  megaproject	  evaluation	  	  The	  narrow	  definition	  of	  project	  success	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  megaproject	  literature	  has	  meant	   that	   the	   broader	   sustainability	   criteria	   of	   evaluation,	   especially	   those	  relating	   to	   the	   socioeconomic	   aspects,	   have	   been	   largely	   overlooked	   in	  megaproject	   evaluation.	   The	   neglect	   of	   the	   context,	   and	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	  rational	   actor	   model	   have	   in	   turn	   contributed	   to	   an	   overemphasis	   on	   planned	  project	  governance	  (as	  opposed	  to	  more	  spontaneous	  project	  “governing”),	  and	  ex	  
ante	   considerations	   (instead	   of	   on-­‐going	   monitoring	   and	   in-­‐depth	   ex	   post	  evaluation),	   hence	   downplaying	   the	   potential	   learning	   functions	   of	   evaluation.	  	  Current	  megaproject	  literature	  has	  also	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  evaluation	   in	  megaproject	  governance,	  governing,	  and	  policymaking	  –	  including	   the	   multiple	   forms	   of	   exercise	   of	   power	   in	   such	   processes	   –	   failing	  notably	  to	  incorporate	  lessons	  from	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  use	  and	  influence	  of	   policy	   and	   programme	   evaluation.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   factors	   have	  contributed	   to	   the	   prevailing	   perception	   of	   accountability	   as	   the	   primary,	   and	  sometimes	  the	  only,	  function	  of	  megaproject	  evaluation.	  	  	  The	  problem	  does	  not,	  however,	   lie	  exclusively	   in	  erroneous	  conceptualisation	  of	  megaprojects,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  practical	  conclusions	  and	  suggestions	  for	  evaluation.	  For	  instance	  Flyvbjerg	  (2011:	  341)	  has	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  paradox	  between	  the	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high-­‐risk,	  stochastic	  nature	  of	  megaproject	   investment	  and	  delivery	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	   the	   control-­‐oriented,	   deterministic	   approach	   to	  megaprojects	   among	  project	  managers	   and	   researchers	   on	   the	   other.	   His	   subsequent	   call	   for	   more	  accountability	   and	   control	   may	   be	   well-­‐intentioned,	   yet	   in	   light	   of	   lessons	   from	  both	  the	  alternative	  readings	  of	  megaproject	  governance	  (e.g.	  van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.,	  2008;	   Giezen,	   2012)	   and	   evaluation	   literature	   (e.g.	   Perrin	   1998;	   Blalock	   et	   al.,	  1999),	   such	   an	   overemphasis	   on	   accountability	   as	   a	   remedy	   against	   “strategic	  misrepresentation”	   could	   in	   fact	   prove	   counterproductive,	   by	   feeding,	   instead	   of	  curbing,	  dishonesty.	  	  Certainly,	  megaprojects	  are	  not	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  accountability	  is	  the	  dominant	  agenda	  especially	  in	  public	  sector	  evaluation	  in	  general,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  trends	   dominant	   in	   public	   sector	   governance	   and	   management	   over	   the	   past	  decades:	   neoliberalism,	   New	   Public	   Management,	   and	   evidence-­‐based	   policy.	  However,	   these	   trends	   have	   been	   accentuated	   by	   a	   number	   of	   characteristics	  specific	   to	   megaprojects.	   Because	   of	   the	   exceptionally	   high	   economic	   stakes	   in	  question,	  politicians,	  opposition	  groups	  and	  the	  media	  call	  for	  strict	  control	  of	  the	  money	   invested,	   and	   often	   employ	   the	   “iron	   triangle”	   criteria	   to	   promote	   or	  criticise	   megaprojects	   (e.g.	   OMEGA,	   2012).	   The	   considerable	   scale	   of	   the	  investments	   needed	   also	   means	   that	   private	   sector	   involvement	   is	   often	  indispensable	   –	   and	  with	   such	   investments	   come	   also	   private	   sector	   investment	  criteria,	   and	   criteria	   for	   judging	   project	   success.	   Professional	   cultures	   probably	  also	   play	   a	   role:	   governance	   and	   expertise	   in	   highly	   technical	   infrastructure	  megaprojects	  is	  dominated	  by	  engineering,	  accounting,	  and	  economics	  disciplines,	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  approach	  the	  problems	  from	  a	  technical-­‐economic	  perspective.8	  Furthermore,	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  to	  enable	   project	   success	   is	   further	   compounded	   by	   the	   high	   complexity	   of	  megaprojects,	  with	  greater	  control	  and	  accountability	   then	  appearing	  as	   ‘natural’	  remedies.	   Finally,	   the	   internal	   dynamics	   of	   the	   academia,	   and	   the	   perception	  among	   key	   scholars	   in	   the	   field	   of	   media	   as	   an	   essential	   vehicle	   for	   treating	  megaproject	   pathologies	   have	   probably	   further	   contributed	   to	   the	   dominance	   of	  one	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  megaproject	  challenges.	  
	  
Ways	  forward:	  towards	  network	  evaluation	  of	  megaprojects	  	  This	   section	   draws	   on	   the	   lessons	   from	   the	   above	   considerations	   to	   outline	  tentative	  ideas	  towards	  evaluation	  that	  would	  better	  recognise	  the	  heterogeneous	  range	  of	  megaprojects;	   the	  multiple	  rationalities	  and	  dynamism	   involved	   in	   their	  governance;	   their	  open-­‐system	  and	  networked	  character;	  and	  the	  broad	  range	  of	  project	  success	  criteria;	  while	  helping	  to	  redress	  the	  balance	  currently	  skewed	  in	  favour	   of	   accountability	   and	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   learning.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   above-­‐
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described	   characteristics	   of	   megaprojects,	   and	   in	   light	   of	   broader	   lessons	   from	  evaluation	   literature,	   the	   objective	   of	   designing	   an	   overarching	   “megaproject	  evaluation	  model”	  appears	  as	  misguided.	  Hence,	   the	  suggestions	   for	  megaproject	  network	   evaluation	   outlined	   in	   the	   following	   are	   not	   meant	   as	   universally	  applicable	   recipe.	   Most	   notably,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   an	   individual	   megaproject	  indeed	  corresponds	  to	  the	  network	  governance	  model	  needs	  to	  be	  decided	  case	  by	  case.	  	  As	  argued	  above,	   the	   characteristics	  of	  megaprojects	   call	   for	  greater	  attention	   to	  learning	  and	  reflexivity	  as	  key	  objectives	  of	  both	  the	  governance	  and	  evaluation	  of	  megaprojects.	   Nevertheless,	   even	   though	   learning	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   central	  purpose	   of	   an	   ideal-­‐type	   network	   governance	   evaluation,	   arguably	   it	   is	  accountability	  that	  constitutes	  the	  Achilles’	  heel	  of	  network	  governance	  evaluation	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  37-­‐38).	  In	  the	  following,	  the	  focus	  will	  therefore	  be	  on	  ways	  of	  redefining	  accountability,	  integrating	  it	  with	  learning	  as	  a	  key	  objective	  of	  network	   evaluation,	   and	   exploring	   the	   consequences	   of	   such	   redefinition	   for	   the	  role	  of	  evaluation	  and	  the	  evaluator	  in	  network	  governance.	  	  	  
Redefining	  accountability	  in	  network	  governance	  	  Traditionally,	  accountability	   is	  perceived	  in	  hierarchical	   terms,	  exercised	  through	  vertical	   relationships	  between	   superiors	   and	   their	   subordinates.	   The	  question	  of	  accountability	  remains	  crucial	  in	  megaproject	  governance	  and	  evaluation,	  if	  for	  no	  other	   reason	   than	   the	   amount	   of	   public	   money	   involved	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  potential	  societal	  impacts	  of	  such	  projects,	  but	  the	  current	  strong	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  accountability	   as	   the	   priority	   objective,	   needs	   to	   be	   reconsidered.	   In	   its	  conventional	  meaning	  “[a]ccountability	  evaluation	  is	  a	  tool	  for	  superiors	  to	  check	  their	   subordinates	   and	   to	   hold	   them	   and	   the	   intervention	   responsible	   for	   their	  actions”	   (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  38).	   In	  network	  governance,	   accountability	  relationships	   are	   complex,	   and	   raise	   questions	   such	   as:	   Who	   can	   be	   held	  accountable,	  when	  no	  single	  actor	  has	  full	  control	  over	  neither	  the	  execution,	  nor	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  governance	  intervention?	  How	  to	  ‘enhance	  accountability’,	  when	  accountability	  structures	  are	  unclear	  and	  evolve	  constantly	  along	  with	  the	  project?	  As	  a	  rule,	  the	  approach	  adopted	  here	  calls	  for	  not	  minimising,	  but	  ‘making	  the	  best	  of’	   the	   inevitable	   uncertainties	   cause	   by	   the	   multiple,	   overlapping,	   horizontal	  accountability	   relationships.	   Accountability	   would	   build	   on	   mutual	   control,	   and	  thereby	  advance	  more	  complex	  types	  of	  learning.	  	  	  A	   redefined	   concept	   of	   accountability	   would	   recognise	   two	   major	   rationales	  underpinning	   accountability	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   the	   of	   principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  The	  rational	  actor	  model	  sees	  accountability	  relationships	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  principal	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to	   reduce	   the	   risk	   that	   the	  agent	  operates	  against	   the	   interests	  and	  objectives	  of	  principal,	  when	  information	  asymmetries	  favour	  the	  agent.	  The	  second	  perspective	  emphasises	   the	   role	   of	   ethics,	   responsibility,	   and	   obligation,	   and	   perceives	  accountability	  as	  a	  vehicle	   for	  discussion	  and	  greater	  understanding	  between	  the	  principal	  and	  agent	  about	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.	  Hence,	  problems	  would	  stem	  not	  from	   opportunism,	   but	   from	   “honest	   incompetence,	   miscommunication,	  organisational	   routines”	   and	   the	   like	   (Benjamin,	   2008:	   326).	   Accountability	  relationships	   would	   contribute	   to	   the	   continuous	   process	   of	   clarifying	   and	  redefining	   the	  principal’s	   goals	   through	  practice	   (ibid.)	  Accountability	   structures	  built	  on	   the	  assumptions	  of	   rational	  actor	  may	  be	  counterproductive	  when	  actor	  relationships	  are	  characterised	  by	  ethical,	  and	  responsibility-­‐based	  considerations	  (Benjamin,	  2008).	  	  
Network	  mapping	  in	  megaproject	  evaluation:	  four	  key	  tasks	  	  	  In	   practice,	   clarification	   of	   the	   multiple	   accountability	   relationships	   in	   order	   to	  foster	  learning	  could	  build	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  “network	  mapping”	  of	  megaprojects.	  Four	  generic	  and	  partly	  overlapping	  tasks	  are	  suggested	  in	  the	  following:	  characterising	  the	   network	   and	   defining	   its	   boundaries;	   defining	   the	   accountability	   structures;	  clarifying	   the	   goals	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	   network	   –	   to	   provide	   a	   referential	   for	  evaluation;	   and,	   exploring	   the	   role	   of	   evaluation	   and	   the	   evaluator	   in	   project	  governance.	  	  
Task	  1:	  Characterising	  the	  network	  and	  defining	  its	  boundaries	  	  The	   first	   task	   of	   network	  mapping	   follows	   suggestions	   by	   Benjamin	   and	   Greene	  (2009):	   characterising	   the	   network	   and	   defining	   its	   boundaries,	   in	   collaboration	  with	   network	   members.	   Key	   questions	   for	   such	   an	   investigation	   include	   the	  following:	   How	   formal	   is	   the	   network?	   Does	   the	   network	   have	   an	   identity?	   Do	  network	  partners	  recognise	  the	  network?	  Is	  there	  a	  formal	  governance	  structure?	  How	  are	  decisions	  made?	  Who/what	  is	  included	  in	  or	  excluded	  from	  the	  network?	  Which	  value	  assumptions	  underpin	  the	  decisions	  of	  inclusion/exclusion?	  Network	  characterisation	  would	  hence	  address	  issues	  such	  as	  distrust,	  power,	  dysfunctional	  cliques,	   and	   missing	   relevant	   actors	   (Benjamin	   and	   Greene,	   2009:	   307).	   In	  politically	   highly	   charged	   situations	   –	   typically	   the	   case	   in	   radioactive	   waste	  management	  –	   the	  definition	  of	   ‘insiders’	   and	   ‘outsiders’	   is	   far	   from	  self-­‐evident:	  the	   ‘insiders’	   may	   seek	   to	   avoid	   responsibilities	   for	   difficult	   decisions,	   whereas	  some	   actors	   who	   consider	   themselves	   as	   ‘outsiders’	   are	   perceived	   by	   others	   as	  ‘insiders’	   –	   and	   hence	   partial,	   especially	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   critics	   of	   the	   project.	  Furthermore,	  some	  opponents	  of	  the	  project	  may	  choose	  to	  remain	  outside	  of	  the	  network	   to	   avoid	   ‘co-­‐optation’,	  while	   seeking	   to	   influence	   the	   network	   from	   the	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outside.	   Methods	   of	   network	   characterisation	   could	   draw	   on	   social	   network	  analysis	  (e.g.	  Drew	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  or	  “ethnoventionism”	  (van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.	  2010).	  While	   ethnoventionism	   has	   been	   primarily	   developed	   for	   intra-­‐organisational	  work,	  it	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  network	  evaluation.	  The	  evaluator	  would	  play	  the	  role	  of	  a	  ‘critical	  friend’,	  engaging	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  with	  the	  network,	  thereby	  seeking	   to	   trigger	   change	   from	   within,	   while	   endeavouring	   to	   keep	   a	   critical	  distance	  to	  the	  dominant	  values	  and	  framings,	  and	  addressing	  the	  complex	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  network	  (van	  Marrewijk	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  224).	  	  
Task	  2:	  Defining	  the	  existing	  accountability	  structures	  
	  When	   the	   evaluand	   is	   an	   evolving,	   loosely	   defined	   network,	   the	   accountability	  structures	  are	  equally	  vague	  and	  evolving.	  The	  second	  task	  would	  therefore	  build	  on	   the	   network	   characterisation	   and	   seek	   to	   define	   the	   existing	   accountability	  structures,	   including	   notably	   the	   horizontal	   accountability	   relationships.	  Evaluating	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   aspects	   presents	   particular	   challenges	   in	  megaproject	   governance.	  While	   the	   accountabilities	   related	   to	   the	   “iron	   triangle”	  issues	  may	  be	  clearly	  defined	  by	  regulatory	  and	  legal	  stipulations,	  it	  is	  usually	  far	  less	   clear	  who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  socioeconomic	   impacts	  of	  a	  megaproject,	  or	  for	   ensuring	   that	   the	   requisite	   socioeconomic	   conditions	   for	   project	  implementation	   are	   in	   place.	   For	   instance,	   responsibilities	   for	   territorial	  development	   are	   shared	   by	   a	   number	   of	   different	   sectors	   of	   public	   sector	  management	  (e.g.	  transport,	  regional	  development,	  with	  responsibilities	  vested	  in	  municipal,	  regional,	  and	  departmental	  authorities).	  	  The	   typology	   of	   Hertting	   and	   Vedung	   (2012)	   that	   identifies	   four	   types	   of	  accountability	   (table	   2)	   provides	   a	   potentially	   useful	   basis	   for	   clarifying	  accountability	  structures.	  The	  typology	  builds	  on	  two	  distinctions:	  between	  actors	  external	   and	   internal	   to	   the	   network,	   and	   between	   horizontal	   and	   vertical	  accountabilities.	  The	  first	  accountability	  relationship	  –	  vertical,	  and	  internal	  to	  the	  network	  –	  concerns	  the	  principal’s	  interest	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	  representative	  in	  the	  network	   governance	   (agent)	   indeed	   properly	   represents	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  principal.	   Evaluation	   of	   this	   type	   of	   accountability	   could	   entail	   for	   instance	   a	  ministry	  commissioning	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  work	  of	  their	  employees	  in	  a	  network,	  in	  order	   to	   ensure	   these	  have	  acted	   in	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  ministry.	  By	  virtue	  of	  their	   sheer	   temporal	  and	  spatial	   scale,	  megaprojects	  multiply	  and	  accentuate	   the	  potential	   conflicts	   and	   tensions	   that	   network	   representatives	   may	   experience	  when	  torn	  between	  multiple	  loyalties	  towards	  their	  principal	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  other	  network	  actors	  on	  the	  other.	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The	   second	   type	   of	   accountability	   –	   internal	   and	   horizontal	   –	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	  evaluation	   of	   megaprojects.	   It	   entails	   mutual	   monitoring	   amongst	   network	  partners,	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  network	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  on	  criteria	  such	  as	   the	   quality	   of	   cooperation;	   sincerity	   of	   partners;	   frequency	   of	   interaction;	  representativeness	   of	   persons	   in	   the	   network,	   etc.	   Trust	   appears	   as	   a	   crucial	  variable,	  especially	  in	  those	  megaprojects	  with	  a	  long	  history	  of	  distrust	  between	  network	  partners	  –	  radioactive	  waste	  management	  being	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  	  	  The	   third	   type	   of	   accountability	   –	   external	   and	   horizontal	   –	   is	   in	   turn	   highly	  relevant	   for	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   aspects	   of	   megaprojects,	   as	   it	  concerns	   the	   shared	   responsibility	   of	   the	   network	   partners	   towards	   relevant	  outside	  stakeholders	  –	  ultimately	  to	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Here,	  the	  key	  question	  is	  how	  successful	   the	  network	   is	   in	  advancing	   the	   ‘general	   interest’	  of	  society,	  or	  the	  interests	  of	  individual	  constituencies	  external	  to	  the	  network.	  Questions	  would	  concern	   the	   extent	   to	   which,	   for	   example,	   the	   chosen	   radioactive	   waste	  management	   solution	   advances	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   in	   the	   local	   area	  surrounding	   a	   planned	   waste	   disposal	   site.	   In	   radioactive	   waste	   policy,	   the	  participants	   external	   to	   the	   network	   would	   ultimately	   include	   the	   future	  generations.	  	  Finally,	   the	   fourth	   accountability	   relationship	   –	   external	   and	   vertical	   –	   concerns	  the	   relationships	   between	   an	   external	   network	   ‘facilitator’	   or	   governor	   and	   the	  network.	  These	  typically	  concern	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  external	  funds:	  have	  the	  network	   members	   correctly	   used	   the	   funds	   allocated	   to	   them	   by	   the	   external	  network	  governor?	   In	   radioactive	  waste	  management,	   this	   type	  of	   accountability	  entails	  the	  government	  controlling	  (auditing)	  the	  use	  of	  the	  money	  allocated	  to	  the	  local	  municipalities	   as	   a	   compensation	   for	   hosting	   a	  waste	   repository.	   However,	  accountabilities	   can	  be	   extended	  beyond	   the	   legality	   of	   the	   use	   of	  money,	   to	   the	  actual	  outcomes	  and	  impacts	  of	  the	  projects	  financed	  by	  the	  compensation	  funds.	  In	   such	   a	   case,	   the	   accountability	   relationship	   would	   also	   extend	   from	   to	   the	  external-­‐horizontal	   combination	   described	   above,	   i.e.	   the	   accountability	   of	   the	  municipal	  authorities	  (as	  network	  members)	  towards	  their	  constituencies.	  	  [Insert	  table	  2]	  	  Definition	  of	   accountability	   structures	  also	   includes	  analysis	  of	   the	   risks	   that	   the	  principal	  perceives	  in	  delegating	  tasks	  to	  the	  agent.	  The	  key	  question	  is	  what	  are	  the	  consequences	  to	  the	  principal	  if	  the	  agent	  fails	  to	  deliver	  the	  expected	  results	  (Benjamin,	  2008).	  In	  network	  governance,	  mutual	  accountability	  relationships	  also	  mean	   mutual	   dependencies	   and	   various	   types	   of	   partly	   unpredictable	   and	  emerging	   risks.	   For	   example,	   the	   responsible	   state	   authorities	   and	   other	   actors	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defending	  a	  given	  waste	  management	  solution	  depend	  on	  local	  actors	  –	  authorities,	  but	   also	   the	   business	   community	   and	   other	   opinion	   leaders	   –	   for	   ensuring	   the	  acceptance	  of	  their	  preferred	  solution.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  local	  actors	  are	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  project	  and	  seek	  to	  enhance	  acceptance,	  they	  depend	  on	  the	  state	  for	  the	   resources	   needed	   to	   enhance	   the	   perception	   among	   the	   citizens	   that	   the	  project	  will	   indeed	  bring	   socioeconomic	  benefits.	   Local	   authorities,	   in	   turn,	   have	  widely	   varying	   motivation	   and	   capacities	   to	   enhance	   acceptance,	   which	   further	  accentuates	   the	   risks	   incurred	   by	   the	   state	   in	   delegating	   responsibilities	  downwards.	  Whether	   this	  preferred	  solution	   is	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (accountability	  relationship	  3	  in	  table	  2),	  is	  often	  contested.	  	  	  
Task	  3:	  clarifying	  the	  goals	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  network	  	  The	   third	   task	  of	  network	  mapping	  would	  be	   to	  clarify	  the	  goals	  and	  objectives	  of	  
the	   network.	   The	   starting	   point	   here	   is	   again	   the	   observation	   that	   megaproject	  evaluation	   has	   excessively	   focused	   on	   the	   “iron	   triangle”	   criteria	   of	   cost,	  timetables,	   and	   compliance	  with	   initial	   project	   prescriptions	   (OMEGA,	   2012).	   To	  account	  for	  the	  dynamic,	  emerging	  goals	  as	  an	  evaluation	  criterion,	  broadening	  out	  of	   the	   evaluative	   criteria	   and	   perspectives	   would	   therefore	   be	   necessary.	   The	  present	   bias	   in	   favour	   of	   ex	   ante	   assessment	   would	   likewise	   need	   to	   be	  complemented	   by	   ex	   post	   evaluation	   and	   ex	   nunc	   monitoring.	   As	   a	   rule,	   the	  exploration	   of	   project	   objectives	   should	   serve	   the	   purposes	   of	   “opening	   up”	   the	  evaluation	   to	   diverse	   perspectives	   and	   participants	   (Stirling,	   2008)	   through	   a	  stakeholder	   evaluation	   approach,	   since	   common	   perceptions,	   frameworks	   and	  visions,	  but	  possibly	  even	  shared	  goals,	  may	  emerge	  through	  networking	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012).	  These	  goals	  could	  be	  explore	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  entire	  network,	  or	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  an	  individual	  network	  participant	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012).	  Benjamin	  and	  Greene	  (2009)	  likewise	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  examination	   of	   goal-­‐achievement	   as	   a	   means	   of	   fostering	   learning	   in	   network	  governance.	  	  	  As	   for	   the	   hitherto	   largely	   neglected	   socio-­‐economic	   aspects	   of	   megaprojects,	  when	  the	  social	  dimension	  is	  addressed,	  it	  is	  frequently	  done	  under	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘socio-­‐economic’,	   with	   the	   emphasis	   on	   ‘the	   economic’	   (e.g.	   Vanclay,	   2004).	   ‘The	  social’	   is	   typically	  conceptualised	   in	  quantitative	  and	  static	   terms,	   focusing	  on	   its	  ‘objective’	  dimensions	  that	  are	  measurable	  through	  externally	  defined	  quantitative	  indicators.9	  ‘Social	  impact	  monitoring’	  is	  often	  reduced	  to	  a	  “checklist	  approach”10,	  which	   fails	   to	   capture	  what	   is	   specific	   to	   ‘the	   social’,	   i.e.	   its	   reflexive,	   immaterial,	  multidimensional	   and	   relational	   character	   (e.g.	   Lehtonen,	   2004).	   This	   type	   of	  monitoring	   is	  weak	   at	   fostering	   learning,	  may	   disempower	   and	   objectify	   people,	  and	   tends	   to	   reinforce	   existing	   power	   asymmetries	  while	   failing	   to	   involve	   local	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communities	  (Rossouw	  and	  Malan,	  2007).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  elaborate	  further	  on	  the	  numerous	  alternative	  context-­‐sensitive	  methods	  and	  approaches	  that	  seek	  to	  integrate	  the	  subjective	  and	  objective	  sides	  of	  ‘the	  social’.11	  Suffice	  to	  say	  that,	  as	  part	   of	   network	   mapping,	   such	   monitoring	   programmes	   would	   be	   developed	  through	   iterative	   and	   participatory	   processes,	   they	   would	   explore	   the	  interconnections	   between	   the	   social	   and	   other	   dimensions	   of	   sustainability,	   be	  explicitly	  based	  on	  theoretical	  models	  that	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  regular	  review	  and	  revision,	  and	  seek	  to	  identify	  the	  causal	  relationships	  between	  the	  project	  and	  its	  impacts.	  	  	  A	  word	  of	  caution	  concerning	  participation	  is	  in	  order.	  Megaprojects	  are	  typically	  characterised	  by	  strong	  asymmetries	  of	  power	  between	  the	  involved	  policy	  actors.	  Hence,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  many	  dimensions	  or	  “faces”	  of	  power	  would	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  element	  in	  network	  mapping	  in	  general,	  and	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  social	  dimension	  in	  particular.	  The	  focus	  would	  be	  not	  only	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  but	  also	   cultural,	   ideological,	   and	  discursive	   forms	  of	  power	   (e.g.	  Galtung,	  1972),	  including	   its	   oppressive	   and	   liberating	  manifestations	   (e.g.	   Flyvbjerg,	   2001:	  116-­‐132;	  Forester,	  2001:	  269).	  Because	  of	  the	  considerable	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  scales	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  complex	  articulation	  between	  the	  local/territorial	  and	  the	  national/international,	   social	   considerations	   in	   megaproject	   governance	   often	  entail	  a	  strong	  ethical	  and	  intergenerational	  component.	  However,	  if	  the	  objective	  is	   to	   reduce	  power	   asymmetries	   and	   enhance	   the	  broader	   “deliberative	   system”,	  non-­‐deliberative	  processes	  of	  evaluation	  may	  be	  the	  best	  option	  in	  the	  context	  of	  highly	  unequal	  power	   relations	   (e.g.	  Hendriks	  2006;	  Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  42).	   Deliberative	   evaluation	   might	   in	   such	   situations	   push	   “legitimate	   and	  important	  conflicts”	  away	  from	  the	  agenda	  (Hertting	  and	  Vedung,	  2012:	  42).	  	  
Task	  4:	  Evaluation	  by	  whom?	  Exploring	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  evaluation	  and	  the	  
evaluator	  	  The	   fourth	  element	  of	  megaproject	  network	  mapping	  –	  exploration	  of	   the	  role	  of	  the	   evaluation	   and	   the	   evaluator	   in	   project	   governance	   –	   builds	   on	   the	   previous	  three	   steps.	  When	  relationships	  between	  stakeholders	  are	  characterised	  by	  deep	  and	   sometimes	   long-­‐standing	   mistrust,	   and	   when	   the	   network	   boundaries	   are	  unclear	   and	   subject	   to	   constant	   change,	   the	   question	   of	   the	   legitimacy	   and	  credibility	  of	   the	  evaluator	   is	  particularly	  crucial.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  evaluations	   conducted	   by	   various	   policy	   actors,	   network	   mapping	   would	   help	  better	   understand	   the	   role,	   credibility,	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   different	   actors	   as	  potential	   or	   actual	   evaluators.	   Hence,	   mapping	   would	   contribute	   to	   the	  identification	  of	  suitable	  evaluators,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  evaluations	  in	  project	  ‘governing’.	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  In	  network	  governance	  of	  megaprojects,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  single	  actor	  would	  have	  both	   the	   interest	   in	   and	   the	   capability	  of	   fostering	  plurality	  of	  perspectives	  and	   reduction	   of	   power	   asymmetries.	   Furthermore,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   organic,	   self-­‐organising	   nature	   of	   governance	   networks	   (e.g.	   Regeer	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Sanderson,	  2012),	  and	  more	  broadly,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  lessons	  from	  evaluation	  literature,	  the	  possibility	   –	   let	   alone	   the	   desirability	   –	   of	   any	   single	   actor	   controlling	   the	  evaluation	  landscape	  appears	  as	  questionable.	  The	  independence	  of	  the	  evaluator	  in	  network	  governance	  evaluation	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  would	  also	  be	  unviable	  and	  undesirable,	  when	  defining	  the	  network	  boundaries	  –distinguishing	  between	  actors	   internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  network	  –	  would	  itself	  be	  a	  central	  evaluation	  task.	  The	  evaluator	  would	  therefore	  unavoidably	  depend	  on	  the	  policy	  participants	  in	   defining	   such	   boundaries	   (Benjamin	   and	   Greene,	   2009).	   Independence,	  credibility	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   evaluator	   would	   be	   anchored	   precisely	   in	   this	  multiplicity	   of	   dependencies.	   Especially	   in	   large,	   complex,	   unique,	   and	   highly	  technical	  megaprojects,	  the	  challenges	  related	  to	  the	  dependencies	  of	  the	  evaluator	  are	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  tend	  to	  be	  concentrated	  into	   few	   hands,	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	   identify	   competent	   evaluators	   perceived	  broadly	  as	  external	  and	  independent	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  	  	  The	  solution	  would	  again	  lie	  in	  the	  network	  itself	  –	  in	  the	  multiple	  responsibilities	  and	   mutual	   accountability	   relationships	   among	   the	   network	   participants.	  Evaluation	   through	   network	  mapping	  would	   be	   a	   distributed	   task	   and	   a	   shared	  interest	  of	  the	  network	  participants,	  designed	  to	  help	  them	  to	  explore	  and	  better	  understand	   the	   context	   of	   project	   “governing”	   (Sanderson,	   2012),	   the	   broader	  evaluation	  ‘ecosystem’,	  and	  their	  own	  role	  within	  this	  context.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  network,	  the	  task	  of	  evaluating	  a	  megaproject	  can	  be	  conducted	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  entire	  network	  or	  an	  individual	  network	  participant,	   through	   deliberative	   or	   non-­‐deliberative	   processes	   (Hertting	   and	  Vedung,	  2012).	  The	  task	  for	  public	  authorities	  would	  then	  be	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  adapt	   to	   the	   evaluation	   ‘ecosystem’	   –	   a	   task	   facilitated	   by	   the	   enhanced	  understanding	   obtained	   through	   network	   mapping	   –	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   to	  manage	   this	   ‘ecosystem’	   by	   seeking	   to	   reduce	   the	   asymmetries	   of	   power	   that	  prevent	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  widest	  possible	  variety	  of	  relevant	  points	  of	  view	  and	   evaluative	   perspectives.	   In	   practice,	   this	   would	   mean	   supporting	   the	  realisation	   of	   evaluations	   by	   the	   weaker	   actors	   and	   from	   underrepresented	  perspectives,	  and	  improving	  their	  visibility	  and	  likely	  impact.	  	  	  
Conclusions	  	  Evaluation	  and	  megaproject	  governance	  literatures	  have	  thus	  far	  lived	  largely	  lives	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of	   their	  own,	  with	   the	   former	  having	  paid	   little	  attention	   to	   the	  specific	  needs	  of	  such	   large	   infrastructure	   projects	   as	   an	   evaluation	   object,	   and	   the	   megaproject	  literature	   failing	   to	   integrate	  many	   of	   the	   lessons	   from	   evaluation	   research	   and	  practice.	  This	  article	  sought	  to	  help	  bridging	  this	  gap	  by	  drawing	  on	  lessons	  from	  network	   governance	   evaluation,	   and	   offering	   initial	   suggestions	   on	   how	  megaproject	   evaluation	   might	   move	   beyond	   its	   currently	   dominant	   approach	  focused	  on	  narrowly	  defined	  accountability,	  skewed	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  rational	  actor	  model,	   and	   largely	   overlooking	   the	   broader	   socioeconomic	   criteria	   beyond	   cost	  and	   timetable	   considerations.	   The	   suggestions	   offered	   here	   highlight	   the	   key	  challenge	   in	   attempts	   to	   deal	   with	   uncertainty	   and	   complexity	   inherent	   in	  megaprojects:	  how	  to	  turn	  into	  strengths	  the	  perceived	  tensions	  between	  control	  and	  collaboration,	  between	  certainty	  and	  uncertainty,	  and	  between	  accountability	  and	  learning?	  	  	  The	   modified	   “network	   mapping”	   approach	   (Benjamin	   and	   Greene	   2009)	  suggested	   here	   was	   designed	   as	   a	   suggestion	   for	   a	   way	   forward	   towards	   a	  response	   to	   such	   challenges.	   This	   approach	   seeks	   to	   retain	   learning	   and	  development	   as	   the	   centrepiece	   of	   network	   evaluation,	   but	   suggests	   the	  exploration	  of	  accountability	  relationships	  as	  a	  vital	  tool	  in	  the	  service	  of	  learning.	  While	   the	   approach	   generally	   advocates	   broad	   stakeholder	   participation	   and	  deliberation,	   and	   opening	   up	   of	   evaluative	   perspectives,	   it	   does	   not	   claim	   to	  provide	   a	   common	   overarching	   framework	   for	   megaproject	   evaluation.	   By	  contrast,	   the	   call	   for	   greater	   attention	   to	   the	   context	   of	   evaluation	   implies	   that	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  strong	  asymmetries	  of	  power	  among	  policy	  actors,	  non-­‐deliberative	  processes,	   including	  approaches	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “speaking	  truth	  to	  power”	   typical	   in	  much	  of	   current	  megaproject	   literature,	  may	   indeed	  have	   their	  role	  to	  play.	  Further	  research	  could	  therefore	  usefully	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	   type	   of	   network	   mapping	   suggested	   here	   might	   be	   appropriate	   in	   given	  megaproject	   situations.	   Evaluation	   of	   the	   radioactive	   waste	   disposal	   projects	  under	  preparation	  in	  various	  countries	  could	  constitute	  a	  fruitful	  subject	  for	  case	  studies.	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Footnotes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	   research	   for	   this	  paper	  has	  been	   financed	  by	   the	  French	   radioactive	  waste	  management	   agency	   (Andra	   –	   Agence	   nationale	   de	   la	   gestion	   des	   déchets	  radioactifs),	   as	   part	   of	   a	   two-­‐year	   project	   aimed	   at	   exploring	   approaches	   and	  methods	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  evaluation	  of	  geological	  radioactive	  waste	  disposal	  in	  France.	   Geological	   disposal	   entails	   the	   excavation	   of	   a	   shaft	   500–1,000	   meters	  below	  the	  surface	   in	  a	  stable	  geological	   formation,	  where	  rooms	  or	  vaults	  can	  be	  excavated	  for	  the	  disposal	  of	  waste.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  permanently	  isolate	  radioactive	  waste	  from	  the	  human	  environment.	  Geological	  disposal	  currently	  represents	  the	  radioactive	   waste	   management	   option	   preferred	   by	   the	   majority	   of	   technical	  experts	   and	   organisations	   in	   the	   area.	   For	   a	   brief	   presentation	   of	   the	   geological	  disposal	   project	   in	   France,	   see	  http://www.andra.fr/international/download/andra-­‐international-­‐en/document/Andra_Geological.pdf	  2	  Here,	  the	  definition	  by	  Hertting	  and	  Vedung	  (2012:	  36)	  is	  adopted:	  “Evaluation	  is	  the	   careful	   assessment	   of	   the	   merit,	   worth,	   and	   value	   of	   organisation,	   content,	  administration,	   output,	   and	   effects	   of	   ongoing	   or	   finished	   government	  interventions,	   which	   is	   intended	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   future,	   practical	   action	  situations.”	  Hence,	  evaluation	  goes	  beyond	  the	  outcomes	  and	  effects,	  and	  includes	  organisational	  and	  process-­‐related	  criteria.	  However,	   the	  definition	   in	  this	  article	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  Hertting	  and	  Vedung	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  includes	  also	  ex	  ante	  evaluation	   and	   assessment	   –	   while	   Hertting	   and	   Vedung	   (2012:	   36)	   exclude	  interventions	  that	  exist	  only	  “on	  the	  drawing	  board”.	  3	  However,	   the	   pattern	   of	   “national	   gain,	   local	   harm”	   is	   not	   always	   clear-­‐cut.	  Flyvbjerg	   (2011:	   329)	   notes	   that	   local	   interests	   often	   win	   over	   national-­‐level	  considerations	   in	   decision-­‐making	   on	   megaprojects,	   because	   of	   asymmetries	   of	  information	   that	   favour	   local	   authorities,	   politicians,	   and	   consultants.	   Yet	  sometimes	   the	   local	   authorities	   and	   businesses	   are	   the	  most	   eager	   advocates	   of	  megaprojects.	  For	  instance,	  transport	  infrastructure	  projects	  are	  often	  expected	  to	  generate	  considerable	  socioeconomic	  benefits	  at	   the	   local	   level,	  while	  potentially	  constituting	  a	  burden	  on	   the	  public	  purse.	  However,	   the	  potential	  harmful	   social	  impacts	   of	  megaprojects	   tend	   to	   fall	   disproportionately	   on	   the	   local	   level	   actors	  (e.g.	  Theys,	  2002;	  Gagnon	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  5).	  4	  Flyvbjerg	   (2011:	   322,	   335)	   mentions	   the	   Bilbao	   Guggenheim	   museum	   and	   a	  major	   tunnelling	   project	   conducted	   as	   part	   of	   the	   preparations	   for	   the	   Sydney	  2000	  Olympics	  as	  among	  the	  few	  exceptions	  of	  successful	  megaprojects.	  5	  For	  instance,	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  construction	  exhibits	  similar	  irreducible	  value	  conflicts,	  but	  do	  not	  have	   the	  same	  character	  of	   “a	  problem	  that	   just	  needs	   to	  be	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  solved”,	   nor	   do	   they	   evoke	   similar	   debates	   on	   very	   long	   term	   intergenerational	  justice.	  6	  Koppenjan	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   contrast	   two	   approaches	   to	  megaproject	   management	  and	   uncertainty	   –	   the	   “predict	   and	   control”	   approach	   in	   which	   “uncertainty	   is	  calculated	  as	  risk	  and	  everything	  is	  done	  to	  control	  as	  many	  aspects	  as	  possible,	  for	  instance	   through	  time	  and	  cost	  buffers”,	  and	   the	  “prepare	  and	  commit”	  approach,	  which	   embraces	   irreducible	   uncertainty	   as	   an	   inherent	   part	   of	   project	  management,	  which	  should	  in	  turn	  be	  organised	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  it	  can	  respond	  to	  unexpected	  developments	  (Giezen,	  2012:	  784).	  7 	  Relevant	   and	   related	   concepts	   found	   in	   the	   literature	   include	   network	  governance	  (Provan	  and	  Kenis,	  2007),	  network	  management	  (Kickert	  et	  al.,	  1997),	  new	  modes	  of	  knowledge	  production	  (Gibbons	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Nowotny	  et	  al.,	  2001),	  network	  steering,	  reflexive	  governance	  (Voß	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  deliberative	  democracy	  (Dryzek,	  2000),	  and	  transition	  management	  (Loorbach,	  2007).	  8 	  Until	   the	   early	   1990s,	   radioactive	   waste	   management	   policy	   was	   a	   typical	  example	   of	   such	   a	   ‘policy	   silo’,	   with	   technical	   engineering	   considerations	   given	  exclusive	  emphasis.	  	  9 	  ‘Objective’	   is	   here	   defined	   as	   information	   independent	   of	   the	   observer,	   as	  opposed	  to	   ‘the	  subjective’	   information	   that	  depends	  on	   individual	   judgement	  by	  the	  observer.	  10	  Objects	   of	   such	  monitoring	   typically	   include	   demographic	   impacts,	   impacts	   on	  ways	  of	   life	   and	   land	  use,	   local/regional	   economy	  and	   intra-­‐firm	   learning,	  public	  participation,	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  perceptions,	  and	  social	  equity	  (Gagnon,	  2003:	  99).	  11	  Useful	  lessons	  could	  be	  drawn	  from	  technology	  assessment	  (Russel	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  social	   impact	   assessment	   (Vanclay,	   2004),	   institutionally	   oriented	   ecological	  economics	  (Vatn,	  2009),	  the	  ‘capability	  approach’	  (Sen,	  1999),	  social	  capital	  theory	  (Ballet	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   territorially	   sustainable	   development	   (Gagnon	   et	   al.,	   2008),	  and	  territorial	  social	  well-­‐being	  (Renault,	  2011).	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